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CONTRACTS
FREDERICK A. WHITNEY t
THE Uniform Commercial Code, in the article pertaining to
Sales, contains several provisions on the contract to sell,
its formation, its construction, its discharge, and the Statute
of Frauds. Since more than half the cases litigated in the
field of contracts involve sales agreements, this area of the
law would be considerably affected by the Code.'
This article proposes to point out and discuss a few of
the more salient changes which will be effected in the New
York law of contracts if the Code is adopted in this state.
IRREVOCABILITY OF OFFERS
At common law, a promise to keep an offer open, even if
in writing and signed by the offeror, was not binding in the
absence of a special consideration received therefor.2 By
statute in New York, however, a promise to keep an offer
open is binding, even without consideration, if it is in writing,
and signed by the offeror.3 If the promise specifies a time,
the offer shall remain open for that period of time; if no time
is mentioned the offer will remain open for a reasonable time.4
f Vice Dean and Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
'Richter, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Preview, 24 CALIF. STATE
BAR J. 414 (1949).
2 See Hallwood Cash Register Co. v. Finnegan, 84 N. Y. Supp. 154 (Sup.
Ct. 1903), where a representative of the plaintiff obtained from the defendant
an order for a cash register written on one of plaintiff's order blanks on
which, above defendant's signature, were printed the words: "This order
shall not be countermanded." Before plaintiff accepted this offer (order) by
shipping the machine, it received a letter from defendant revoking his order.
Plaintiff nevertheless shipped the register and suing for the price, received
judgment. Defendant appealed, contending no liability because no contract.
In reversing the judgment, Mr. Justice MacLean wrote: "He [defendant] is
right, for his statement that he would not countermand, being without con-
sideration, was not binding, and acceptance or acts tending thereto by the plain-
tiff, subsequent to the revocation of the order, were unavailing and ineffectual."
Id. at 155.
3N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(5).
4Ibid.
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The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
An offer by a merchant 5 to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which gives assurance that it will be held open needs no consideration
to be irrevocable for a reasonable time or during a stated time but in
no event for a time exceeding three months; but such term on a form
supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.6
It should be observed that the Code provision speaks
only of offers made by merchants. According to the section
comment,7 however, a non-merchant's offer may become ir-
revocable under this section ". .. when it is shown that the
offeror had full understanding of the nature and effect of the
offer made." 8 It is to be noted, also, that under this section,
an offeror is protected from inadvertently signing an agree-
ment containing an irrevocability clause by the requirement
that such clause be separately authenticated by the offeror
if the form is prepared by the offeree.9 Authentication may
consist in initialing the clause involved.' 0
Thus, the Code, if adopted, would effect two important
changes in the present New York law relating to the revoca-
tion of offers:
1. The present statutory rule that a promise to keep an
offer open is binding without consideration if expressed in
5 The Code draws a distinction between a "merchant" and a "non-merchant"
in applying some of the rules, the reason given, being that transactions between
professionals in a given field require special and clear rules which may not
apply to a casual or inexperienced seller or buyer. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §2-104, Comment 1 (Spring 1950). The term, "merchant," is defined
as ". . a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill."
UNIFORM COmMERCIAI. CODE § 2-104(1) (Spring 1951).
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205 (Spring 1951).
7 Each section of the Code is followed by a comment explaining the pur-
pose and coverage of the section. These comments ". . . may be consulted in
the construction and application of this Act but where text and comment con-
flict, text controls; ...." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(3) (f) (Spring
1951). The comments referred to and quoted from in this article are those
appearing in the Spring 1950 draft, since, at press time, the comments for the
1951 draft has not yet been published.
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
9 Id., Comment 5.
10 Id., Comment 3.
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a signed writing"1 would be limited by the Code so that it
would apply only to offers by merchants 12 unless it could be
shown that the non-merchant offeror had a ".... full under-
standing of the nature and effect of the offer made." 18
2. Whereas at present no maximum period for irrevoca-
bility is fixed by statute, the Code would impose an outside
limit of three months on the period of irrevocability whether
a time is fixed by the parties or not.14 it should be noted,
however, that this limitation would apply only to current
"firm" offers, and not to long-term options. 15
COUNTER-OFFERS
Under the existing law of contracts, it is generally held
that a reply by an offeree containing additional terms, not
expressly or impliedly included in the offer, is regarded as a
counter-offer; 16 and when received by the offeror, amounts
to a rejection and termination of the original offer.17
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from
those offered or agreed upon.
(2) The additional or different terms are to be construed as proposals
for addition to the contract and between merchants become part of
the contract unless they materially alter it or notification of objec-
tion to them is given within a reasonable time.' 8
This section imposes upon the offeror, who has received
a communication from the offeree purporting to be an accep-
31N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §33(5).12 UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
13 Ibid.
14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-205 (Spring 1951).
'15 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. COnE § 2-205, Comment 4 (Spring 1950).
16 Porter v. Gossell, 112 Ark. 380, 166 S. W. 533 (1914); Poel v. Bruns-
wvick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310, 110 N. E. 619 (1915); GRIsSOE0
ON CONTRACTS § 49 (1947) ; 1 WILLISTON ONl CONTRACTrS §§ 72, 73, 77 (Rev.
ed. 1936), and cases there cited.
17 Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U. S.
149 (1886).I8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207 (June 1951).
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tance, but stating additional terms, the duty of rejecting the
same at the risk of being bound thereto, unless the additional
terms "materially alter" the agreement already reached by
the parties. The test as to whether additional terms "ma-
terially alter" the bargain is whether they would normally
occasion surprise to a merchant in that line of business. If
so, they will not be included in the contract unless expressly
agreed to by the other party.19 On the other hand, if the
additional terms are such as frequently appear in contracts
in that trade or line of business, they will not be regarded as
materially altering the contract, and will be incorporated
automatically unless notification of objection is "given" 20
within a reasonable time.21
This provision of the Code is intended to apply even
when the parties have reached an agreement by correspon-
dence and one of them in a formal acknowledgment thereof
adds terms which have not been discussed.2 2  Likewise, it is
29 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, Comment 4 (Spring 1950). "Exam-
ples of typical clauses which would normally 'materially alter' the contract and
so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by
the other party are: a clause negating such standard warranties as that of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances in which
either warranty normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or
100% deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, where the usage of the
trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to the seller the power
to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any invoice when due; a clause re-
quiring that complaints be made in a time materially shorter than customary
or reasonable."
20 What constitutis "giving" notice is not clear; whether notice of objection
is "given" on mailing or not until it is received, has not been specified. It
would seem that the term "given" should require receipt of the objection.2 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, Comment 5 (Spring 1950). "Exam-
ples of clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise and which
therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is
seasonably given are: a clause setting forth and perhaps enlarging slightly
upon the seller's exemption due to supervening causes beyond his control . .. ;
a clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints within customary limits, or
in the case of a purchase for subsale, providing for inspection by the sub-
purchaser; a clause providing for interest on overdue invoices or fixing the
seller's standard credit terms where they are within the range of trade practice
and do not limit any credit bargained for; a clause limiting the right of re-
jection for defects which fall within, the customary trade tolerances for ac-
ceptance 'with adjustment' or otherwise limiting remedy in a reasonable
manner....2 2 UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE § 2-207, Comment 1 (Spring 1950). In a
leading New York case, Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209,
39 N. E. 75 (1894), after an agreement had been reached through correspon-
dence for the sale and shipment of apples, the buyer returned to the seller
the formal contract declaring that he would not sign it unless certain addi-
tional terms were inserted which had not been referred to in the correspondence.
[ VOL. 26
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operative when the wire or letter which is expressed and in-
tended as the confirmation or closing of an agreement adds
such minor suggestions or proposals as, "ship draft against
bill of lading inspection allowed" or "ship by Tuesday." 23
ACCEPTANCE Or AN OFFIER
(a) Medium of Comnmunication
At present, the acceptance of an offer must be made or
dispatched in a manner and through a means of communica-
tion either expressly or impliedly authorized by the offeror
before a contract can arise upon the starting forward of the
acceptance.24  Thus where an offer was sent by mail, it was
held that it could not be accepted by telegraph so as to close
a contract upon dispatch of the telegram of acceptance.25
The New York Court of Appeals held that the buyer had no right to insist
on the proposed modifications but was bound without them on the agreement
already reached through the correspondence. Cf. Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co., 216 N. Y. 310, 110 N. E. 619 (1915).
23 UNI ORM CoMmCI.L CODE §2-207, Comment 1 (Spring 1950). In the
leading case of Neer v. Lang, 252 Fed. 575 (2d Cir. 1918), to an offer from
the defendant to sell 20 shares of Saxon Motor common stock at 400 the plain-
tiff wired: "We accept twenty Saxon at four hundred ship with draft attached
and wire when you have done this." In affirming the judgment of the court
below that the correspondence disclosed no contract, Mr. Justice Rogers of the
appellate court said: "The telegram 'accepts twenty Saxon at four hundred.'
If nothing more had been added, a valid contract would have resulted. . . .
But the telegram contained something more, and that was 'Ship with draft
attached and wire when you have done this.' This imported a new item into
the acceptance and prevented a contract from being made." Id. at 576.
In Cameron v. Wright, 21 App. Div. 395, 47 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1st Dep't
1897), an offer was made to sell stock at 33 cents on the dollar. The alleged
acceptance was in a telegram reading: "I accept offer; 33 for all your stock;
draw three days sight draft with stock attached." This was held to be a vari-
ance from the offer, and the interposition of a term not embraced in the offer
and therefore not binding.
24 "The series of English decisions which establish the doctrine that the
acceptance of an offer is complete so soon as a letter of acceptance has been
posted begins with Adains v. Lindsell (1 B. and Ald. 681), which was decided
in 1818, and concludes with Henthorn v. Fra-rer, (1892) 2 Ch. 27, in which
judgment was given in 1892. In every one of these cases, except the last one,
it was clear as a matter of fact that the offeror authorized the acceptor to
make use of the post as a means of signifying his acceptance." Innes, C.J.,
in Bal v. Van Staden, Transvaal Law Reports, 128 (1902).
Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F. 2d 415 (1st Cir. 1929); Lucas v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 131 Iowa 669, 109 N. W. 191 (1906). Contra: Weld and Co.
v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 Fed. 770 (E. D. N. C. 1913): Farmers Produce Co.
v. McAlester Storage and Commission Co., 48 Okla. 488, 150 Pac. 483 (1915)
(decided under a state statute).
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The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless the contrary is unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting accep-
tance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circum-
stances .... 26
The Code comment to this section declares that "Former
technical rules as to acceptance, such as requiring that tele-
graphic offers be accepted by telegraphed acceptance, etc., are
hereby rejected and a criterion that the acceptance be 'in any
manner and by any medium reasonable under the circum-
stances,' is substituted." 27
(b) Manner of Acceptance
The policy of the Commercial Code to adopt a liberal
view as to what may constitute such acceptance as to close
a contract is further illustrated by Section 2-204 which
provides:
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner suffi-
cient to show agreement.
(2) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a con-
tract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale even though the
moment of its making cannot be determined. 28
This provision is directed primarily to the situation in
which the actions of the parties indicate that a binding obli-
gation has been undertaken, but the interchanged correspon-
dence does not disclose the exact point at which the deal was
closed.29
It is believed that this section of the Code states a prin-
ciple broader than most courts have enunciated. It is easy
to conceive of a situation when the moment of the making of
a contract would be material, e.g., when the specific goods,
which are the subject matter of the contract, are destroyed
20 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(1) (a) (Spring 1951).27 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
28 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-204 (Spring 1951).2 9 UNIFORM COM MERCIAL CODE § 2-204, Comment (Spring 1950).
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during the period of negotiation."0 Unless it could be deter-
mined at what time the contract arose it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to determine whether or not title and risk
of loss have passed.
(c) Acceptance of Order for Shipment
At present, an offer can be accepted either by an act or
a promise, depending upon which the wording of the offer
and/or the surrounding circumstances, indicate the offeror
intends to be the acceptance of his offer.3 1  A reward offer,
for example, clearly calls for an act as the acceptance. In
the case of an offer for the purchase or sale of merchandise,
however, it is often difficult to determine whether the offeror
wants a return promise or the offeree's act of shipping the
goods or of making payment to serve as the acceptance. 2
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
... an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current ship-
ment can be accepted either by such shipment or by a prompt promise
thereof. 33
30 Phillips v. Moor, 71 Me. 78 (1880); 6 WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTs § 1946
(Rev. ed. 1938).
31 1 WILLIsToN ON CONTRACTS § 31A (Rev. ed. 1936).
32 Thus in Dickey v. Hurd, 33 F. 2d 415 (1st Cir. 1929), a written
offer to sell land stated: " ... I will sell the same to you for $15 per acre
cash and give you till July 18, 1926, including that day to accept this offer."
The offeree replied by wire on July 17th that he would accept. Circuit Judge
Bingham said: "A more difficult question is whether the offer calls for pay-
ment of the purchase price, an act of acceptance on or before July 18; or
whether it simply calls for a notice of acceptance." Id. at 418. Referring to
the language of the offer, he said: "Standing alone and apart from the sur-
rounding circumstances, the words 'to accept this offer' are equivocal. They
may mean that he would give through July 18 to accept the offer by paying
the price fixed; or would give him through that date to accept the offer by
giving him notice to that effect." Ibid. The learned justice pointed out that
on two occasions prior to July 18 the offeror had received letters from the
offeree clearly indicating that the latter construed the offer as calling merely
for notice of acceptance before July 18, and that since the offeror had not cor-
rected that impression by notifying the offeree that payment on or before July
18 was intended acceptance, he was bound by the offeree's reasonable construc-
tion of the offer as calling only for notice of acceptance before that date. Ibid.
In Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N. Y. 209, 39 N. E. 75(1894), an offer to sell apples read: "this proposition to be accepted not later
than the 31st inst., and you to pay us $500 upon acceptance of the proposi-
tion. . . ." It was held that the contract was closed upon the giving of a
notice of acceptance without the contemporaneous payment of $500.
33 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(1) (b) (Spring 1951).
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The section rejects the theory that only one mode of ac-
ceptance is normally envisaged by an offer, and, in accordance
with ordinary commercial understanding, interprets an order
looking to current shipment as allowing acceptance either by
actual shipment or by a prompt promise to ship.3 4
(d) Shipment of Wrong Goods as an Acceptance
At common law, no act could be an acceptance of an
offer so as to form a contract unless it was the very act called
for by the terms of the offer.3 5
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless the seller states the contrary a shipment sent in response to
an order to which it does not conform is an acceptance and at the
same time a breach.3 6
According to its comment, this provision applies to the
situation where a shipment made following an order is
plainly referable to that order but has a defect. Such a non-
conforming shipment is treated as simultaneously closing the
bargain and breaching it. 37 However, where, as an attempted
accommodation to the buyer, the seller ships admittedly non-
conforming goods in substitution for those ordered, the ship-
ment would not be such an acceptance as would give rise to
a contract.
38
(e) Commencing Performance as Acceptance
Under present law, if an offer calls for an act as the
acceptance, the mere commencing to perform it is not an
acceptance.39 Also, where the offer is to pay for certain work,
and states that the offeree may begin the work upon an agree-
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
35 1 WILLIsToN ON CoNRAncrs § 73 (Rev. ed. 1936).
s6 UNIrOM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(2) (Spring 1951).3 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206, Comment 4 (Spring 1950).
38 Ibid.
39 Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669 (1890); Petterson v.
Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928), in which the Court of Appeals
held that the offeror had the right to revoke his offer even after he knew that
the offeree had taken steps to perform the act called for as an acceptance.
See also Sonino v. Magrini, 225 App. Div. 536, 234 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st
Dep't 1929), holding that part performance by the offeree will not prevent the
offeror from withdrawing his offer.
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ment to complete it within a fixed period, the commencing to
do the work without agreeing to complete it within the time
specified is not an acceptance of the offer.40
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
The beginning of a requested performance can be a reasonable mode
of acceptance but in such a case an offeror who is not notified of ac-
ceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed
before acceptance.4 1
The Comment to this section advises that the beginning
of performance by an offeree can be effective as an acceptance
only if followed by notice to the offeror within a reasonable
time. Such beginning of performance must unambiguously
demonstrate the offeree's intention to engage himself.42
It is the rule in some jurisdictions (although not in New
York) 43 that the beginning of performance by an offeree has
the intermediate effect of barring revocation of an outstand-
ing offer.44 Similarly, the Restatement declares that per-
formance begun within a reasonable time after the making
of an offer is an acceptance and will give rise to a contract,
subject to the condition subsequent that if the work so begun
is not prosecuted with due diligence, the contract is null and
void.4 5  It is interesting to note that the Code requirement
that notice to the offeror be given within a reasonable time
after the beginning of performance, in no way defeats the
operation of such rules. 46
40 White v. Corlies, 46 N. Y. 467 (1871).
41 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(3) (Spring 1951).
4 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
43 Quincy and Co. Arbitrage Corp. v. Cities Service Co., 156 Misc. 83, 282
N. Y. Supp. 294 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (lst
Dep't 1937). Where, however, an entire and indivisible offer is made, calling
for a series of performances as soon as the first performance is completed, the
offeror may not revoke the offer. Post v. Albert Frank & Co., 75 Misc. 130,
132 N. Y. Supp. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
44 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Calif. 654, 67 Pac. 1086
(1902); Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769 (1912).
45 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 45 (1932) : "If an offer for a unilateral con-
tract is made, and part of the consideration requested in the offer is given or
tendered by the offeree ...the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of
immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being
given or tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is stated
therein, within a reasonable time." This rule has been rejected in New York.
See note 43 supra.46 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
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INDEFINITENESS
(a) Term Left Open for Future Adjustment
One needs no authority to say that at common law the
terms of an agreement were required to be definite and com-
plete. If they were not, and a legal controversy arose, there
would be no way for the court to determine what the respec-
tive obligations were, or whether they had been performed.
Consequently, it has generally been held that where an execu-
tory agreement is indefinite or incomplete as to one or more
material terms, no recovery can be had for its breach.47 Like-
wise, "agreements to agree" on terms are unenforceable.
48
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale
does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appro-
priate remedy.4 9
Under this section, any agreement will be recognized as
valid in law, if it can be shown: (1) that the parties intended
to enter into a contract; and (2) that there is a reasonably
certain basis for granting a remedy. Thus, certainty as to
the duties of the respective parties or the amount of damages
owing to the plaintiff would not be the test of validity. In-
stead, the binding character of a contract would be measured
by the application of commercial standards on the point of
indefiniteness. In determining the intention of the parties,
the number of terms left open in the contract are to be con-
sidered, but the actions of the parties may frequently be con-
clusive on the matter despite the number of omissions.50
47Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 111 N. E. 822 (1916); Chard v.
Ryan-Parker Co., 182 App. Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dep't 1918).
48 United Press v. N. Y. Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527 (1900);
Duffield & Co. v. Ellsworth, 143 Misc. 40, 255 N. Y. Supp. 716 (Sup. Ct. 1932).4 9 UNIFORM CommEcIAL CODE § 2-204(3) (Spring 1951).
5 0 UNIFORM CommERCIAL CODE § 2-204, Comment (Spring 1950). See also
Richter, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Prezview, 24 CALIF. STATE BAR 3.
414, 420 (1949). "The concept of a 'meeting of the minds' on all the essential
terms of a contract has long been embedded in the law. Yet, section 2-204 of
the Article on Sales provides that a contract for sale does not fail for indefi-
niteness even though one or more terms are left open if the parties have in-




(b) Performance Term to be Supplied
It has been held in New York that a written contract for
the sale and shipment of goods is not incomplete or invalid
merely because it makes no provision for incidental and im-
material matters of performance, such as destination, routing
and name of consignee.' 1 However, the courts have empha-
sized the incidental and immaterial character of the omis-
sions. The Code makes no such emphasis. Instead, it simply
provides that sales contracts, which are otherwise sufficiently
definite, are not made invalid by the fact that particulars of
performance are left to be specified by one of the parties. 2
The "agreement" which enables one party to specify miss-
ing terms in such contract may be express or implicit from
the course of dealing, usage of trade, or the surrounding
circumstances.5 3
In exercising the power to so specify, the party to whom
it is given must of course act reasonably and in accordance
with commercial practice. Indeed, the range of permissible
variation is expressly limited to what is "commercially
reasonable." 14
(c) As to Price Terms
It has been held that the price term of a contract of sale
must be definite, and that an "agreement to agree" on the
price term is unenforceable. 5
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even
though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reason-
able price at the time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price;
51 Rosenberg Bros. and Co. v. F. S. Buffum Co., 234 N. Y. 338, 137 N. E.
609 (1922) ; Loomis v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 203 N. Y. 359, 96 N. E. 748(1911).
52 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-311(1) (Spring 1951).53 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-311, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
.4 Ibid.
55 United Press v. N. Y. Press, 164 N. Y. 406, 58 N. E. 527 (1900), where
the price term was "a sum not exceeding three hundred dollars during each and
every week." The Court of Appeals held that this was too indefinite as it
merely stated the limit which the price to be paid each week must not exceed;
it would have to be the subject of future agreement and hence the contract was
not binding since neither party could be compelled to agree with the other.
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or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to
agree; or (c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market
or other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency and
it is not so set or recorded.5 6
Under this section, "[a] price to be fixed by the seller or
by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith." 57
There is a further provision to the effect that a wrongful in-
terference by one party with the agreed machinery for price-
fixing in the contract may be treated by the wronged party as
a repudiation justifying cancellation. Or, at his option, the
aggrieved party may himself fix a reasonable price.
5
, In still
another subsection the Code provides:
Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the price
be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract.
In such a case the buyer must return any goods already received or
if unable so to do must pay their reasonable value at the time of de-
livery and the seller must return any portion of the price paid on
account.59
Thus the Code recognizes that there may be cases in
which a particular person's judgment is not chosen merely
as the index or barometer of a fair price, but is an essential
condition to the parties' intention to make any contract at
all. For example, the case where an art expert is to appraise
a particular oil painting may differ markedly from the situa-
tion where a named "expert" is to determine the market qual-
ity of a quantity of tobacco. The difference in circumstances
might well support a finding that in the former instance, the
parties did not intend to make a binding agreement if the
particular expert was unavailable; whereas in the latter sup-
position, it might justifiably be concluded that a contract
was intended even though the "expert" proved to be
unavailable.6"
-9 UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 2-305(1) (Spring 1951).5 7 Id. § 2-305 (2).
5 8 UNIFORM COMmERcIAL. COD: § 2-305, Comment 5 (Spring 1950).
5 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305(4) (Spring 1951).
6 0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-305, Comment 4 (Spring 1950).
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(d) As to Duration of Performance
At common law, a contract calling for continuing per-
formance but containing no provision for its duration, was
construed to be terminable at the will of either party. 1 Al-
though the rule has had its most frequent application to con-
tracts of agency and employment, it has been expressed as
applicable to other types of agreement, including those for
the purchase and sale of commodities. 62
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Where the contract provides for successive performances but is
indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless other-
wise agreed may be terminated at any time by either party.6 3
In determining what is a "reasonable time" under this
section, it is necessary to consider the surrounding circum-
stances of the case. For example, where an arrangement has
been carried on by the parties for a number of years, the
"reasonable time" may continue indefinitely, and the con-
tract would not terminate until notice. 4
Still another subsection provides:
Termination of a contract by one party except on the happening
of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received
by the other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.65
This latter subsection is explained as a recognition that
sound commercial practice and principles of good faith nor-
mally call for such notification of the termination of a going
contract relationship as will give the other party a reasonable
time in which to seek a substitute arrangement.66
Taken together, the above provisions would seem to effect
a change in the present New York rule which is that no notice
is required to be given by the party electing to terminate a
61 Watson v. Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535, 98 N. E. 18 (1912); Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E. 416 (1895).62 Cronk v. Vogt's Ice Cream Co., 15 N. Y. S. 2d 649, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
6 3 UNIFORM CoMMFalciAL CODE § 2-309(2) (Spring 1951).
6 4 UNIFORM COmmERcIAL CODE § 2-309, Comment 7 (Spring 1950).
6 5 UNIFORM CommEaciAL CODE § 2-309(3) (Spring 1951).
6 6 UNIFORM CommmLcLI. CODE § 2-309, Comment 8 (Spring 1950).
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contract indefinite as to duration,67 unless the party against
whom cancellation is sought, has, to the knowledge of the
cancelling party, made heavy outlays of money or equipment
or made other commitments necessary to carry out his part
of the agreement.6 8
AUCTION SALES
The Uniform Sales Act, now in force and effect in thirty-
seven states including New York, provides:
"A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer an-
nounces its completion by the fall of the hammer, or in other
customary manner. Until such announcement is made, any
bidder may retract his bid; and the auctioneer may withdraw
the goods from sale unless the auction has been announced
to be without reserve." 69 It should be observed that in the
second sentence of the above quotation, the words, "any
bidder may retract his bid" are shut off by a semicolon from
the last clause, "unless the auction has been announced to
be without reserve." Consequently, this latter clause applies
only to the right of the auctioneer to withdraw the goods
from sale, and does not limit the right of the bidder to retract
his bid. That right is unlimited under the first part of the
sentence preceding the semicolon. In other words, under ex-
isting law, any bidder may retract his bid before the hammer
falls even if the sale has been announced to be without
reserve.
But under the proposed Code, he may not. The appli-
cable section provides:
In an auction without reserve the goods cannot be withdrawn nor a
bid retracted.70
67 "There are loose statements in some of the early cases that notice is
necessary (Jones v. Turner, 80 Hun 157, 30 N. Y. S. 65; Ward v. Ruckman,
34 Barb. 419; Liftchild v. Johnson, 31 N. Y. Super. Ct. 459), but it is doubtful
whether they express the law now. Cammack v. J. B. Slattery & Bro., Inc.,
241 N. Y. 39, 47, 148 S. E [sic] 781 ... " Cronk v. Vogt's Ice Cream Co.,
15 N. Y. S. 2d 649, 654 (1939).
68 See Cronk v. Vogt's Ice Cream Co., 15 N. Y. S. 2d 649, 655 (Sup. Ct.
1939).
69 UNIFORM SALEs AcT § 21(2); N. Y. PFas. PROP. LAW § 102(2).70 UNIFORM CommEaciAL CODE § 2-328(3) (Spring 1951).
[ VOL. 26
CONTRACTS
Still another change is effected in the law governing
auction sales by the Code provision which specifies that goods
may be withdrawn at any time before they are actually "put
up" regardless of whether the auction is advertised as one
without reserve. 71 Under existing law, an auctioneer may
withdraw goods from sale only if the sale had not been an-
nounced to be "without reserve." No definition is given in
the Code for the expression "put up for sale"; presumably
the question of whether goods had actually been put up for
sale would be left for the jury in each particular case.
REQUIREMENT CONTRACT-EFFECT OF ESTIMATE
In requirement contracts, the parties sometimes insert
an estimate of the quantity that will be required. Such esti-
mate would seem to be intended to limit the seller's obliga-
tion, and at the same time to afford a basis for computing
the buyer's probable needs, in other words, to have legal
effect either as a maximum to the seller's liability or a mini-
mum to the buyer's liability. In the majority of states, how-
ever, the estimate is treated by the courts as having no legal
effect whatsoever, except when made by the buyer in bad
faith. In such case, it operates as a maximum to the seller's
liability.7 2
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller
or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or require-
ments as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreason-
ably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a
stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output
or requirements may be tendered or demanded.73
Thus if an estimate of output or requirements is included
in the agreement, no quantity unreasonably disproportionate
to it may be tendered or demanded. Any minimum or maxi-
mum set by the agreement shows a clear limit on the intended
elasticity. In similar fashion, the agreed estimate is to be
71 UNIFORM CozlmERcrAL CODE § 2-328, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
7 2 See 28 COL. L. REv. 223 (1928).7 3 UNIFORM CoMMERcIAL CODE § 2-306(1) (Spring 1951).
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regarded as the center around which the parties intend the
variation to revolve. 4
MODIFICATION OF EXISTING CONTRACT
Generally, a promise to modify an existing contract is
unenforceable unless supported by some new additional con-
sideration.7 5 By statute in New York, however, if the new
promise, modifying an existing contract, is in writing and
signed by the promisor, it is not denied effectiveness merely
because of the absence of consideration to support it.
7 6
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no con-
sideration to be binding.77
According to its comment, this section seeks to protect
and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications
of sales contracts, without regard to the technicalities which
at present hamper such adjustments. Reasonable modifica-
tions due to unforeseen circumstances or affecting matters
which do not go to the essence of the agreement are intended
to be effective without consideration.7 8  Although the Code
provides that an agreement modifying a contract needs no
consideration to be binding, the comment advises that pro-
posed modifications must meet the test of good faith,79 and
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds,80 so as to
limit possible oral modification."' The test of "good faith"
requires in the first instance, ". . . an objectively demon-
strable commercial reason for seeking the readjustment." 82
There need not be an unforeseen difficulty severe enough to
make out a legal excuse for non-performance; such matters
as a market shift which, in the event of performance, would
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-306, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
75Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392 (1883); see Schwartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch, 231 N. Y. 196, 203, 131 N. E. 887, 889 (1921).
76 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 33(2).
77 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209(1) (Spring 1951).78 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
7 9 Id., Comment 2.801d., Comment 3.
81 Ibid.
82 Id., Comment 2.
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result in a loss, will meet the test of good faith in seeking a
readjustment. 83
ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTS
Under present law, if the assignment of a contract con-
tains an express promise by the assignee to assume the
assignor's duties, the other original party to the contract may
sue the assignee on such promise as beneficiary even though
no consideration moved from him to the assignee for such
promise.8 4 In the absence of such express promise, however,
no promise on the part of the assignee to assume the
assignor's duties will be implied from the mere acceptance
by him of the assignment.85 The Restatement declares:
"Where a party to a bilateral contract which is at the time
wholly or partially executory on both sides, purports to
assign the whole contract, his action is interpreted, in the
absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, as
an assignment of the assignor's rights under the contract and
a delegation of the performance of the assignor's duties. Ac-
ceptance by the assignee of such an assignment is inter-
preted, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary
intention, as both an assent to become an assignee of the
assignor's rights and as a promise to the assignor to assume
the performance of the assignor's duties." 88 The courts of
New York have expressly declined to follow this rule of the
Restatement.87
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the
contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment
of rights and unless the circumstances indicate the contrary (as in
an assignment for security) it is a delegation of performance of the
duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes
83 Ibid.
84 See Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 162, 164 N. E. 890, 891 (1928).8 5 Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928).
8 6 RsTAT M ET, CoNTRACrS § 164 (1932).87 Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890 (1928); Smith v. Morin
Bros., 233 App. Div. 562, 253 N. Y. Supp. 368 (4th Dep't 1931).
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a promise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforce-
able by either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.8 8
The Code provision is self-explanatory.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
(a) Amount of Price to Come Within the Statute
Statutes in force and effect throughout the United States
and England have generally provided that contracts for the
sale of personal property of a value in excess of a fixed
amount are unenforceable unless in writing and signed by
the party to be charged. The original Uniform Sales Act
set the amount at five hundred dollars, 9 but the various state
legislatures have altered the figures to conform with their
peculiar commercial clime.9 0 In New York, the price has
been fixed at fifty dollars.9 ' The Uniform Commercial Code
sets the amount at five hundred dollars.2
(b) Party Signing Memorandum
The existing Statute of Frauds in New York requires
the contract of sale or memorandum thereof to be signed by
the party to be charged or by his agent.9 8 The plaintiff can-
not manufacture the evidence required by means of a writing
signed only by himself. 4
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in con-
firmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies
the requirements . . . [of the Statute of Frauds] against such party
88 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-210(4) (Spring 1951).
8 9 UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4.
9 0 E.g., Connecticut and Michigan set the amount at one hundred dollars,
while Minnesota and Wisconsin have adopted a fifty-dollar minimum. In New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, the price is fixed at five hundred dollars.
91N. Y. PERs. PRop. LAW § 85(1).
92 TJNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201 (Spring 1951).
93 N. Y. PRS. PROP. LAW § 85.
94 Accord, 300 West End Ave. Corp. v. Warner, 250 N. Y. 221, 165 N. E.
271 (1929) ; cf. Lord v. Cronin, 154 N. Y. 172, 47 N. E. 1088 (1897).
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[the party receiving it] unless written notice of objection to its con-
tents is given within ten days after it is received. 5
Thus, as between merchants, the failure of the recipient
of a letter of confirmation to acknowledge or reject it would
be tantamount to a writing, and would preclude either party
from asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. Such fail-
ure to object, however, is not conclusive on the existence of
a contract. The party who has failed to answer may still
prove that no contract was ever in fact madeY8
(c) Completeness of the Memorandum
It has been held in New York that a memorandum, to
be sufficient, must contain all the essential terms of the bar-
gain, leaving no material term for future agreement,9' that
it must correctly reflect the oral understanding,98 and that
it must clearly indicate which party is the seller, and which
is the buyer.99
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a
term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable . . . beyond the
quantity of goods shown in such writing.'00
According to the section comment the required writing
need not indicate which party is the buyer and which is the
seller, need not contain all the material terms of the contract,
and need not state precisely such material terms as are in-
cluded. Indeed, the only term which must appear is the
quantity term, and even that is not required to be stated
accurately. Where such term is inaccurately stated, how-
ever, recovery is limited to the amount set forth in the memo-
randum. "All that is required is that the writing afford a
95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(2) (Spring 1951).
96 UNIFORM CommERcI-L CODE § 2-201, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).9
7 Bernat v. West Seventy-Third Street Corp., 230 App. Div. 18, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 612 (1st Dep't 1930); Pollak v. Dapper, 219 App. Div. 455, 220 N. Y.
Supp. 104 (1st Dep't 1927); Spielvogel v. Veit, 197 App. Div. 804, 189 N. Y.
Supp. 899 (2d Dep't 1921).
98 Berman Stores Co. v. Hirsch, 240 N. Y. 209, 148 N. E. 212 (1926).
19 Irvmor Corp. v. Rodewald, 253 N. Y. 472, 171 N. E. 747 (1930).100 UNIFORM COMMERCLAL CODE § 2-201 (1) (Spring 1951).
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basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a
real transaction." 11
(d) Part Acceptance--Part Payment
The existing New York Statute of Frauds provides that
in lieu of a memorandum signed by the party to be charged,
the oral contract is enforceable if there has been a receipt
and acceptance of the goods or part of them, or payment, or
part payment. 102 The very language of the statute warrants
the conclusion that the receipt and acceptance of part of the
goods or part payment makes the contract as a whole enforce-
able and not merely enforceable as to such part acceptance
or part payment.10 3
The Statute of Frauds section of the proposed Commer-
cial Code declares that a contract which does not satisfy the
requirement of a writing, but which is valid in other respects,
is enforceable "... with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted." 104 The comment to this section points out that
the "delivery and acceptance" test is limited to the goods
which have been accepted,0 5 and that "partial performance"
as a substitute for the required memorandum can validate
the contract only for the goods which have been accepted or
for which payment has been made and accepted. 10 6
DELIVERY UNDER ENTIRE CONTRACT
Under existing statute in New York, and under the Uni-
form Sales Act, if a seller tenders delivery of a quantity less
than the contract calls for, the buyer has the right to reject
the tender, even though the seller expects to deliver the bal-
ance, and such rejection will not be a breach of contract. 07
Likewise, if an entire contract does not fix the time for pay-
101 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 1 (Spring 1950).
lO2N. Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW §85(1).
103 Ibid.
104 UN FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3) (c) (Spring 1951).
105 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
106 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 2 (Spring 1950).
107 UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 44; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 125(1).
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ment, no payment is due and enforceable until full perfor-
mance has been tendered. The seller has no right to demand
a proportionate payment after delivery of some of the
goods.108
If adopted, the Uniform Code will effect some modifica-
tion in each of the above mentioned rules. The pertinent
Code section provides:
Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by a contract for
sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due only on
such tender, but where the circumstances give either party the rights
to make or denmand delivery in lots the price if it can be apportioned
may be demanded for each lot. (Italics supplied.) 0 9
Thus, in cases where it is not commercially feasible to
deliver or to receive all of the goods contracted for in a single
lot (e.g., where a contract is for the purchase of all of the
bricks needed for an apartment house), a partial delivery
may not be arbitrarily rejected, and the seller may even de-
mand a proportionate payment of the purchase price.110 Of
course, the partial delivery must be made under circum-
stances which "... do not indicate a repudiation or default
by the seller as to the expected balance .... , 11 And, the
undelivered balance must be forthcoming within a reasonable
time and in a reasonable manner." 2
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In lNew York, the Civil Practice Act requires that an
action upon a contract obligation must be commenced within
six years after the cause of action has accrued." 3 Under
the proposed Code, an action for breach of any contract for
sale would have to be commenced within four years after the
cause arose."
4
208 Cf. Stewart v. Newberry, 220 N. Y. 379, 115 N. E. 984 (1917); Baker
v. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 397 (1860); Kelly Construction Co. v. Hackensack Brick
Co., 91 N. J. L. 585, 103 Ati. 417 (1918).
10 9 UNIFORM COMmERCIAL CODE § 2-307 (Spring 1951).
210 UNIFORM CommERCuAL CODE § 2-307, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
'' Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48(1).
114 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(1) (Spring 1951).
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This provision is intended to take sales contracts out of
the general laws which limit the time for the commencement
of contract actions. A four-year period has been selected as
the most appropriate to modern business practice, since it is
within the normal "keeping period." 11 The Code permits
the parties by agreement to reduce the period of limitation
to one year, but not to extend it."16 The Code section would
not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations." 7
POLICING CONTRACTS BY THE COURTS
It has been repeatedly declared by courts in so-called
"hard cases" (i.e., cases where, although the parties were
dealing at arm's length, and with eyes open, one of them has
made a "bad bargain," or failed to insert a condition for his
protection) that the court will not make a better contract
for him than he himself made."" Even where actual coercion
has been practiced, the farthest the courts have gone is to
declare the contract void or voidable. They have never re-
formed contracts on their own initiative and have done so
at the request of the parties only when it appears that there
has been a mutual mistake." 9
The Uniform Commercial Code provides:
If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
be unconscionable it may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike
any unconscionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken
clause had never existed.' 20
The practice thus authorized by this section has been
referred to by some commentators as one of "policing" con-
tracts by the courts.' 2 ' Indeed, the pertinent Code comment
expressly declares: "This section is intended to make it
115 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-727, Comment (Spring 1950).
116 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(1) (Spring 1951).
117 Id. § 2-725(4).
11s Mullen v. Hawkins, 141 Ind. 363, 40 N. E. 797 (1895) ; Raner v. Goldberg,
244 N. Y. 438, 155 N. E. 733 (1927) ; Chandler v. Webster, [1904] 1 K. B. 493.
119 See Metzger v. Aetna Ins. Co., 227 N. Y. 411, 417, 125 N. E. 814, 816
(1920).
120 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (Spring 1951).
121 Note, Policing Contracts Under Proposed Commercial Code, 18 U. OF
CHi. L. REv. 146 (1950).
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possible for the courts to police explicitly against the con-
tracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable ...
This section is intended to allow the court to pass on the un-
conscionability of the contract or particular clause therein
and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscion-
ability." 122 If the determination as to unconscionability of
any clause or contract should involve passing on a question
of fact, such fact question, like questions of law, would be
for the court to determine. 12 3
CONCLUSION
A summary and appraisal cannot readily or even prop-
erly be predicated upon the type of examination which has
been employed in the above survey of proposed Code change
of present contract law. Indeed, none is intended. Suffice
it to say, that the changes proposed by the Code are
significant and tradition-uprooting. If effected, they will
-for a time--precipitate lawyerly confusion and increased
uncertainty.
But they are not to be condemned merely because they
are changes. There is nothing sacred about inadequate con-
tract principles. Indeed, the whole history of contract law
has been one of remodelling and revamping to meet the
changing needs of changing times.1 24
'
2 2 UNFO CoMummcaA, CODE § 2-302, Comment I (Spring 1950).
12 3 UNIORM CoMMERciAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 3 (Spring 1950).
224 Cf. HOLmES, THE COMMON LAW 247 (1923).
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